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Why Think That the Brain Is Not a 
Computer? 
Marcin Miłkowski 
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OF SCIENCES 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I review the objections against the claim 
that brains are computers, or, to be precise, information-
processing mechanisms. By showing that practically all 
the popular objections are either based on uncharitable 
interpretation of the claim, or simply wrong, I argue that 
the claim is likely to be true, relevant to contemporary 
cognitive (neuro)science, and non-trivial. 
Computationalism is here to stay. To see why, I will review 
the reasons why one could think that the brain is not a 
computer. Although more reasons can be brought to bear 
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on the issue, my contention is that it’s less than likely that 
they would make any difference. The claim that the brain 
is a specific kind of an information-processing mechanism, 
and that information-processing is necessary (even if 
not sufficient) for cognition, is non-trivial and generally 
accepted in cognitive (neuro)science. I will not develop 
the positive view here, however, as it was already stated 
sufficiently clearly to my tastes in book-length accounts.1 
Instead, I will go through the objections, and show that 
they all fail just because they make computationalism a 
straw man. 
SOFTWARE AND NUMBER CRUNCHING 
One fairly popular objection against computationalism is 
that there is no simple way to understand the notions of 
software and hardware as applied to biological brains. But 
the software/hardware distinction, popular as the slogan 
“the mind to the brain is like the software to hardware,”2 
need not be applicable to brains at all for computationalism 
to be true. There are computers that are not program-
controllable: they do not load programs from external 
memory to internal memory to execute them. The most 
mundane example of such a computer is a logical gate 
whose operation corresponds to a logical connective, e.g., 
disjunction or conjunction. In other words, while it may 
be interesting to inquire whether there is software in the 
brain, there may as well be none, and computationalism 
could still be true. Hence, the objection fails, even if it is 
repeatedly cited in popular press. 
Another intuitive objection, already stated (and defeated) 
in the 1950s, is that brains are not engaged in number-
crunching, while computers, well, compute over numbers. 
But if this is all computers do, then they don’t control 
missiles, send documents to printers, or display pictures 
on computer monitors. After all, printing is not just number 
crunching. The objection rests therefore on a mistaken 
assumption that computers can only compute numerical 
functions. Computer functions can be defined not only 
on integer numbers but also on arbitrary symbols,3 and as 
physical mechanisms, computers can also control other 
physical processes. 
SYMBOLS AND MEANING 
The notion of a symbol is sometimes interpreted to 
say that symbols in computers are, in some sense, 
abstract and formal, which would make computers 
strangely dis-embodied.4 In other words, the opponents 
of computationalism claim that it implies some kind of 
dualism.5 However, computers are physical mechanisms, 
and they can be broken, put on fire, and thrown out of 
the window. These things may be difficult to accomplish 
with a collection of abstract entities; the last time I tried, 
I was caught red-handed while committing a simple 
category mistake. Surely enough, computers are not just 
symbol-manipulators. They do things, and some of the 
things computers do are not computational. In this sense, 
computers are physically embodied, not unlike mammal 
brains. It is, however, a completely different matter whether 
the symbols in computers mean anything. 
One of the most powerful objections formulated against 
the possibility of Artificial Intelligence is associated with 
John Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment.6 Searle 
claimed to show that running of a computer program is not 
sufficient for semantic properties to arise, and this was in 
clear contradiction to what was advanced by proponents 
of Artificial Intelligence who assumed that it was sufficient 
to simulate the syntactic structure of representations for 
the semantic properties to appear; as John Haugeland 
quipped: “if you take care of syntax, the semantics will take 
care of itself.”7 But Searle replied: one can easily imagine 
a person with a special set of instructions in English who 
could manipulate Chinese symbols and answer questions 
in Chinese without understanding it at all. Hence, 
understanding is not reducible to syntactic manipulation. 
While the discussion around this thought experiment is 
hardly conclusive,8 the problem was soon reformulated by 
Stevan Harnad as “symbol grounding problem”:9 How can 
symbols in computational machines mean anything? 
If symbol grounding problem makes any sense, then one 
cannot simply assume that symbols in computers mean 
something just by being parts of computers, or at least 
they cannot mean anything outside the computer so easily 
(even if they contain instructional information10). This is an 
assumption made also by proponents of causal-mechanistic 
analyses of physical computation: representational 
properties are not assumed to necessarily exist in physical 
computational mechanisms.11 So, even if Searle is right 
and there is no semantics in computers, the brain might 
still be a computer, as computers need no semantics to be 
computers. Maybe something additional to computation is 
required for semantics. 
Let us make the record straight here. There is an important 
connection between the computational theory of mind and 
the representational account of cognition: they are more 
attractive when both are embraced. Cognitive science 
frequently explains cognitive phenomena by referring to 
semantic properties of mechanisms capable of information­
processing.12 Brains are assumed to model reality, and these 
models can be computed over. While this seems plausible 
to many, it’s important to remember than one can remain 
computationalist without assuming representationalism, or 
the claim that cognition requires cognitive representation. 
At the same time, a plausible account of cognitive 
representation cannot be couched merely in computational 
terms as long as one assumes that the symbol grounding 
problem makes sense at least for some computers. To make 
the account plausible, most theorists appeal to notions of 
teleological function and semantic information,13 which 
are not technical terms of computability theory nor can be 
reduced to such. So, computers need something special to 
operate on inherently meaningful symbols. 
What made computationalism so strongly connected to 
cognitive representations was the fact that it offered a 
solution to the problem of what makes meaning causally 
relevant. Many theorists claim that just because the syntax in 
computer programs is causally relevant (or efficacious), so 
is the meaning. While the wholesale reduction of meaning 
to syntax is implausible, the computational theory of mind 
makes it clear that the answer to the question includes the 
causal role of the syntax of computational vehicles. Still, it 
is not an objection to computationalism itself that it does 
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not offer a naturalistic account of meaning. That would be 
indeed too much. 
The debate over the meaning in computers and animals 
abounds in red herrings, however. One recent example 
is Robert Epstein’s essay.14 While the essay is ridden with 
confusion, the most striking mistake is the assumption 
that computers always represent everything with arbitrary 
accuracy. Epstein cites the example of how people remember 
a dollar bill, and assumes that computers would represent 
it in a photographic manner with all available detail. This is 
an obvious mistake: representation is useful mostly when 
it does not convey information about all properties of the 
represented target (remember that the map of the empire 
is useful only when it is not exact?15). If Epstein is correct, 
then there are no JPEG files in computers, as they are not 
accurate, and they are based on lossy compression. And 
there are no MP3 files. And so on. No assumption of the 
computational theory of mind says that memory should be 
understood in terms of the von Neumann architecture, and 
only some controversial theories suggest that it should.16 
Epstein also presses the point that people are organisms. 
Yes, I would also add that water is (mostly) H2O. It’s true 
but just as irrelevant as Epstein’s claim: physical computers 
are, well, physical, and they may be built in various ways. 
It’s essential that they are physical. 
A related objection may be phrased in terms of James J. 
Gibson’s ecological psychology. Ecological psychologists 
stress that people do not process information, they just 
pick it up from the environment.17 This is an interesting 
idea. But one should make it more explicit what is meant 
by information processing in the computational theory of 
mind. What kind of information is processed? It should be 
clear enough that the information need not be semantic, 
as not all symbols in computers are about something. 
The minimal notion that should suffice for our purposes 
is the notion of structural information: a vehicle can bear 
structural information just in case it has at least one degree 
of freedom, that is, may vary its state.18 The number 
of degrees of freedom, or yes-no questions required 
to exactly describe its current state, is the amount of 
structural information. As long as there are vehicles with 
multiple degrees of freedom and they are part of causal 
processes that cause some other vehicles just like some 
model of computation describes these processes,19 there 
is information processing. This is a very broad notion, as 
all physical causation implies information transfer and 
processing in this sense.20 
Right now it’s important to note that the Gibsonian notion 
of information pickup, interesting as it is, requires vehicles 
of structural information as well. There needs to be some 
information out there to be picked up, and organisms 
have to be so structured to be able to change their state in 
response to information. Gibsonians could, however, claim 
that the information is not processed. Frankly, I do not 
know what is meant by this: for example, Chemero seems 
to imply that processing amounts to adding more and more 
layers of additional information, like in Marr’s account of 
vision.21 Why information processing should require 
multiple stages of adding more information is beyond me. 
Even uses of Gibsonian information in, say, simple robots, 
are clearly computational, and insisting otherwise seems 
to imply that the dispute is purely verbal. To sum up: the 
Gibsonian account does not invalidate computationalism 
at all. 
CONSCIOUSNESS 
Some people find (some kinds of) consciousness to be 
utterly incompatible with computationalism, or at least, 
unexplainable in purely computational terms.22 The 
argument is probably due to Leibniz with his thought 
experiment in Monadology.23 Imagine a brain as huge as a 
mill, and enter it. Nowhere in the interplay of gears could 
you find perceptions, or qualitative consciousness. Hence, 
you cannot explain perception mechanically. Of course, 
this Leibnizian argument appeals only to some physical 
features of mechanisms, but some still seem to think that 
causation has nothing to do with qualitative consciousness. 
Notice also that the argument, if cogent, is applicable more 
broadly, not just to computationalism; it is supposed to 
defeat reductive physicalism or materialism. 
For example, David Chalmers claims that while awareness, 
or the contentful cognitive states and processes, can be 
explained reductively by appealing to physical processes, 
there is some qualitative, phenomenal consciousness that 
escapes all such attempts. But his own positive account 
(or one of his accounts) is panpsychism, and it states 
that whenever there is physical information, there is 
consciousness. Qualitative consciousness. So how is this 
incompatible with computationalism, again? According 
to Chalmers, qualitative consciousness supervenes on 
information with physical necessity (not conceptual one). 
So be it, but it does not invalidate computationalism, of 
course. 
Notice also that virtually all current theories of 
consciousness are computational, even the ones that 
appeal to quantum processes.24 For example, Bernard 
Baars offers a computational account in terms of the 
global workspace theory,25 David Rosenthal an account in 
terms of higher-level states,26 and Giulio Tononi in terms 
of minimal information integration.27 Is there any theory of 
consciousness that is not already computational? 
Let us turn to Searle. After all, he suggests that only a non-
computational theory of consciousness can succeed. His 
claim is that consciousness is utterly biological.28 Fine, 
but how does this exactly contradict computationalism? 
You may build a computer of DNA strands,29 so why claim 
that it’s metaphysically impossible to have a biological 
computer? Moreover, Searle fails to state which biological 
powers of brains specifically make them conscious. He 
just passes the buck to neuroscience. And neuroscience 
offers computational accounts. Maybe there’s a revolution 
behind the corner, but as things stand, I would not hold 
my breath for a non-computational account of qualitative 
consciousness. 
TIME AND ANALOG PROCESSING 
Proponents of dynamical accounts of cognition stress that 
Turing machines do not operate in real time. This means 
that this classical model of computation does not appeal 
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to real time; instead, it operates with the abstract notion 
of the computation step. There is no continuous time flow, 
just discrete clock ticks in a Turing Machine.30 This is true. 
But is this an objection against computationalism? 
First, there are models of computation that appeal to real 
time.31 So one could use such a formalism. Second, the 
objection seems to confuse the formal model of computation 
with its physical realization. Physical computers operate 
in real time, and not all models of computation are made 
equal; some will be relevant to explaining cognition, and 
some may be only useful for computability theory. What 
is required for explanatory purposes is a mechanistically-
adequate model of computation that describes all relevant 
causal processes in the mechanism.32 
Universal Turing machines are crucial to computability 
theory. But one could also appeal to models of analog 
computation if required. These are still understood as 
computational in computability theory, and some theorists 
indeed claim that the brain is an analog computer, which is 
supposed to allow them to compute Turing-incomputable 
functions.33 While this is controversial (others claim that 
brains compute in a more complex fashion34), it shows that 
one cannot dismiss computationalism by saying that the 
brain is not a digital computer, as Gerald Edelman did.35 
There are analog computers, and an early model of a neural 
network, Perceptron, was analog.36 The contention that 
computers have to be digital is just dogmatic. 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
There are a number of arguments with a form: 
1. People ψ. 
2. Computers will never ψ. 
So, artificial intelligence is impossible (or 
computationalism is false). 
This argument is enthymematic, but the conclusion follows 
with a third assumption: if artificial intelligence is possible, 
then computers will ψ. The plausibility of the argument 
varies from case to case, depending on what you fill for ψ. 
For years, people thought that winning in chess is ψ,37 but it 
turned out to be false, which makes the argument instance 
unsound. So, unless there is a formal proof, it’s difficult to 
treat premise 2 seriously. 
So what could be plausibly substituted for ψ? Obviously, 
not sexual reproduction, even if it is humanly possible. 
There are many properties of biological organisms 
that simply seem irrelevant to this argument, including 
exactly the same energy consumption, having proper 
names, spatiotemporal location, and so on. The plausible 
candidate for substitution is some capacity for information-
processing. If there is such capacity that humans have but 
computers cannot, then the argument is indeed cogent. 
So what could be the candidate capacity? The classical 
argument pointed to the human ability to recognize the 
truth of logical statements that cannot be proven by a 
computer.38 It is based on the alleged ability of human 
beings to understand that some statements are true, 
which is purportedly impossible only for machines (this 
argument is based on the Gödel proof of incompleteness 
of the first-order predicate calculus with basic arithmetic). 
The problem is that this human understanding has to be 
non-contradictory and certain. But Gödel has shown that 
it’s undecidable in general whether a given system is 
contradictory or not; so either the argument states that 
it’s mathematically certain that human understanding 
of mathematics is non-contradictory, which makes the 
argument inconsistent (it cannot be mathematically certain 
because it’s undecidable); or it just dogmatically assumes 
consistency, which means that the argument is implausible, 
and even unsound because we know that people commit 
contradictions unknowingly.39 
Another argument points to common sense. Common 
sense is a particularly difficult capacity, and the trouble 
with implementing common sense on machines is 
sometimes called (somewhat misleadingly) the frame 
problem.40 Inferential capacities of standard AI programs 
do not seem to follow the practices known to humans, 
and that was supposed to hinder progress in such fields 
as high-quality machine translation,41 speech recognition 
(held to be immoral to fund by Weizenbaum42), and so 
on. Even if IBM Watson wins in Jeopardy!, one may still 
think it’s not enough. Admittedly, common sense is a 
plausible candidate in this argument. Notice that even if 
the proponent of the computational theory of cognition 
could reject the necessity of building genuine AI that is 
not based on a computer simulation of human cognitive 
processes, he or she still has the burden of showing that 
human common sense can be simulated on a computer. 
Whether it can or not is still a matter of debate. 
COMPUTERS ARE EVERYWHERE (OR DON’T
REALLY EXIST) 
Still another argument against computationalism brings 
pretty heavy artillery. The argument has two versions. 
The first version is the following: at least some plausible 
theories of physical implementation of computation lead to 
the conclusion that all physical entities are computational. 
This stance is called pancomputationalism. If this is the case, 
then the computational theory of mind is indeed trivial, as 
not only brains are computational, but also cows, black 
holes, cheese sandwiches, and what not, are computers. 
However, a pancomputationalist may reply by saying that 
there are various kinds (and levels) of computation, and 
brains do not execute all kinds of computation at the same 
time.43 So it’s not just computation that is specific to brains, 
but there is some non-trivial kind of computation specific to 
brains. Only the kind of pancomputationalism that assumes 
that everything computes all kinds of functions at the same 
time is catastrophic, as it makes physical computation 
indeed trivial. But this is what Hilary Putnam claims—he 
even offered a proof that one can ascribe arbitrary kinds of 
computation to any open physical system.44 
Another move is to say that computers do not really exist; 
they are just in the eyes of beholder. John Searle has 
made both moves: the beholder decides whether a given 
physical system is computational, and therefore may make 
this decision for virtually everything. But the body of work 
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on physical computation in the last decade or so has been 
focused on showing why Putnam and Searle were wrong.45 
The contemporary consensus is that computational models 
can adequately describe causal connections in physical 
systems, and that these models can be also ascribed 
wrongly. In other words, computational models are not 
different in kind from any mathematical model used in 
science. If they are mere subjective metaphors and don’t 
describe reality, then mathematical models in physics are 
subjective as well.46 
Intuitively, arguments presented by Searle and Putnam are 
wrong for a very simple reason: nobody would buy a new 
computer if it was just easier to think that an old computer 
simply implemented new software. I could stare at my 
old laptop and think that it’s a brand new smartphone. It’s 
obvious that it doesn’t work this way. Therefore, there must 
be a flaw in these arguments somewhere, and even if the 
technicalities involved are indeed interesting, they fail to 
establish the conclusion. 
A popular strategy to defeat triviality arguments is to 
show that it is ad hoc: the ascriptions of computational 
states to physical systems wouldn’t support relevant 
counterfactuals.47 In other words, they couldn’t, for example, 
accurately predict what kind of computation would run on a 
physical system, were things slightly different. While this is 
intuitive, I have argued that one can strengthen the triviality 
strategies to deal with counterfactuals.48 As long as one is 
poised to predict the evolution of a physical process, one 
can invent a computational ascription. Thus, instead, one 
should look for a systematic solution that presupposes that 
computational models are not different in kind from other 
causal models in science. This is the move recommended 
by David Chalmers, who has stressed that computational 
models should be understood causally.49 However, his 
strategy requires all computational models to be rephrased 
to use his favorite mathematical model of computation, 
combinatorially structured finite-state machine (CFSA), and 
then matched to a causal structure of a physical system. 
But rephrasing has an important disadvantage: the states 
of an original model of computation may turn out to be 
causally inefficacious. This is why, in reply to Chalmers, I 
suggested that computation should be modeled directly in 
a mechanistically-adequate model of computation whose 
causal organization matches the organization of a physical 
mechanism, and appeal to standard explanatory norms.50 
The norms of mechanistic explanation, which should be 
followed when explaining a computational system causally, 
are sufficient to block triviality arguments. (For example, 
ascriptions will turn out to be extremely non-parsimonious, 
and will not offer any new predictions except the ones 
already known from a physical description of a system, 
which suggests that the model is based on so-called over-
fitting.) 
All in all, triviality arguments required theorists to spell out 
the account of physical computation much more clearly but 
are not a real danger to computationalism. This is not to say 
that more often than not, empirical evidence is insufficient 
to decide between vastly different hypotheses about the 
computational organization of a given mechanism. But 
again, this is not in any way special for computational 
hypotheses, since theories are generally underdetermined 
by evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Let me wrap up. In this paper, I have listed and summarized 
a number of arguments against computationalism. The 
only objection that does not seem to be implausible at the 
first glance is the one that states that common sense is 
impossible or extremely difficult to implement on a machine. 
However, more and more commonsensical capacities are 
being implemented on machines. For example, in the 1990s 
and early 2000s, I used to work as a technical translator 
for software companies. We used to laugh at machine 
translation, and nobody would use it professionally. But it’s 
the machine that translates the Microsoft Knowledge Base, 
which was extremely difficult for professionals to deal with. 
While the quality of machine translation is still behind the 
best human beings for complex literary translations, it is no 
longer something that translators laugh at. We use machine 
translation at work and merely post-edit it. 
The point is that there’s no good reason to think that the brain 
is not a computer. But it’s not just a computer. It is, of course, 
physically embedded in its environment and interacts 
physically with it with its body, and for that, it also needs a 
peripheral nervous system51 and cognitive representations. 
But there’s nothing that denies computationalism here. 
Most criticisms of computationalism therefore fail, and 
sticking to them is probably a matter of ideology rather 
than rational debate. 
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